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Abstract. In a multisecret sharing scheme, several secret values are
distributed among a set of n users, and each secret may have a differ-
ent associated access structure. We consider here unconditionally secure
schemes with multithreshold access structures. Namely, for every subset
P of k users there is a secret key that can only be computed when at
least t of them put together their secret information. Coalitions with at
most w users with less than t of them in P cannot obtain any information
about the secret associated to P . The main parameters to optimize are
the length of the shares and the amount of random bits that are needed
to set up the distribution of shares, both in relation to the length of
the secret. In this paper, we provide lower bounds on this parameters.
Moreover, we present an optimal construction for t = 2 and k = 3, and
a construction that is valid for all w, t, k and n. The models presented
use linear algebraic techniques.
Key words: unconditional security, multisecret sharing schemes, thresh-
old access structures.
1 Introduction
1.1 Multisecret Sharing Schemes
In a secret sharing scheme some secret information is distributed into shares
among a set of users in such a way that only authorized coalitions of users can
reconstruct the secret from their shares. Such a scheme is said to be perfect if
unauthorized subsets of users do not obtain any information about the secret.
Multisecret sharing schemes are a generalization of such schemes. In a mul-
tisecret sharing scheme a number of secret values are distributed; we use J as
the set of indices for this secret values. For each one of these secrets there will
be some coalitions authorized to know it, and some other coalitions that will not
be able to obtain any information about it.
For every j ∈ J , we call Γj the access structure associated with the secret
corresponding to the index j, that is the collection of subsets authorized to
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2know that particular secret. We also call ∆j the forbidden structure associated
with the secret corresponding to the index j, that is the collection of subsets
unauthorized to know it. Naturally, the collection of subsets Γj is monotone
increasing, while ∆j is monotone decreasing. Obviously, Γj ∩∆j = ∅ for every
j ∈ J .
In a multisecret sharing scheme we define the specification structure Γ as the
collection of pairs of access and forbidden structures associated with the secret
indexed by the elements in J ,
Γ = {(Γj ,∆j) : j ∈ J }.
Multisecret sharing schemes are defined as a collection of random variables
satisfying certain properties in terms of Shannon entropy. We denote by Si the
random variable associated with the share of user i ∈ U . Likewise, if A =
{i1, . . . , ir} is a set of users, then SA is the random variable associated with
the shares of users in A, that is SA = Si1 × · · · × Sir .
A perfect multisecret sharing scheme with specification structure Γ = {(Γj ,∆j) :
j ∈ J } is formed by two collections, {Si}i∈U and {Kj}j∈J , of random variables
satisfying:
1. If A ∈ Γj then H(Kj |SA) = 0.
2. If B ∈ ∆j then H(Kj |SB) = H(Kj).
The random variables {Si}i∈U correspond to the secret information distributed
among the users, while the random variables {Kj}j∈J correspond to the shared
secret keys. Observe that, with this definition, we require the schemes to be un-
conditionally secure, namely the forbidden subsets cannot obtain any informa-
tion on the secrets, independently of the computational power of the adversary.
The efficiency of a multisecret sharing scheme is measured by means of the
complexity σ and the randomness σT . The complexity σ is the ratio between the
amount of information received by every user and the amount of information
corresponding to the key. The randomness σT is the ratio between the amount
of information distributed to the set of users U and the amount of information
corresponding to the key. Namely,
σ =
maxi∈U H(Si)
minj∈J H(Kj)
σT =
H(SU )
minj∈J H(Kj)
We observe that both complexity and randomness are greater or equal than 1.
These parameters are a generalization of the ones used to measure the efficiency
of secret sharing schemes. As for the easier case of secret sharing schemes, the
optimization of these parameters for general specification structures is a very
difficult open problem. Nevertheless, in the seminal paper on secret sharing by
Shamir [10], optimal schemes are presented for threshold access structures. In
contrast, no general optimal constructions of multisecret sharing schemes are
known for this simple case of threshold specification structures. The optimality
of such a construction is proved by comparing its complexity to some lower
bound. General lower bounds for the complexity of multisecret sharing schemes
with threshold structure were given in [7]. We present here general lower bounds
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very particular values of the thresholds [1, 3, 8]. Shamir’s polynomial construction
of secret sharing schemes was generalized by Brickell [5] and Simmons [11], by
using linear algebra technics; specifically they introduced linear secret sharing
schemes. The same development took place in key predistribution schemes. The
polynomial construction by Blundo et al. [3] was generalized by Padro´ et al. [9]
to a linear construction. This linear framework is the starting point in our new
approach to multithreshold schemes.
1.2 Multithreshold Sharing Schemes
This paper presents constructions of multisecret sharing schemes for some type
of specification structures defined by thresholds. These kind of schemes are called
multisecret threshold sharing schemes, or multithreshold schemes for short, and
were introduced by Jackson, Martin and O’Keefe [7].
In these schemes, every secret is associated with a subset P⊂U of k users.
Shares distributed among users must be created in such a way that every subset
with at least t users in P is authorized to know P ’s secret, and every subset with
at most w users, having less than t users in P , is unauthorized.
The specification structure of a multithreshold schemes depends on four pos-
itive integers w, t, k and n satisfying:
• 1 ≤ t ≤ k ≤ n
• t− 1 ≤ w ≤ n− k + t− 1
On a set U of n users, the specification structure of a w-secure (t, k, n) multi-
threshold sharing scheme is defined as follows:
– J = {P ⊆ U : |P | = k}
– For every P ∈ J ,
• ΓP = {A ⊆ U : |A ∩ P | ≥ t}
• ∆P = {B ⊆ U : |B| ≤ w, |B ∩ P | ≤ t− 1}
When k = n, then a single secret is shared. In this case, we have a threshold
access structure, and the threshold sharing scheme by Shamir [10] provides an
optimal solution. If t = 1, then we have a Key Predistribution Scheme (KPS).
Optimal constructions were given in [3].
Complete w-secure (t, k, n) multithreshold schemes are those with w = n −
k + t− 1. If a multithreshold scheme is complete, for any P ∈ J and B ⊆ U , a
subset B such that |B ∩ P | < t is P -unauthorized.
1.3 Known Results
The first multisecret schemes were multithreshold schemes with t = 1, and they
were called Key Predistribution Schemes (KPS) [3]. In these schemes, any user
in P ∈ J can calculate P ’s secret by itself without any additional information.
There are some interesting constructions of KPSs: the model presented in [3],
4based on symmetric polynomials, and the model in [9], called Linear KPS, de-
signed using linear maps. Linear KPS unify the previous proposals of KPS. On
the other hand, when k = n and w = t − 1, then we have a threshold secret
sharing scheme [10].
In the rest of constructions of multithreshold schemes, t = 2. Namely, Jack-
son, Martin and O’Keefe found a geometric construction of an (n−k+1)-secure
(2, k, n) multithreshold scheme [8]. Moreover, Barwick and Jackson [1] gave an-
other geometric construction for w-secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold schemes.
Jackson, Martin and O’Keefe studied in [7] some bounds on the size of shares,
and gave a lower bound on the complexity of a w-secure (2, 3, n).
1.4 Our Results
We present here a new framework to study multisecret sharing schemes. We
introduce the concept of linear multisecret sharing scheme that extends the cor-
responding notion in secret sharing and key predistribution schemes. This formal
setting simplifies the security proofs in the constructions of multisecret sharing
schemes.
By using our approach, we present a new construction of a w-secure (2, 3, n)
multithreshold scheme with optimal complexity and randomness that is simpler
than the scheme with the same properties given by Barwick and Jackson [1].
We find a new lower bound on the randomness of a multithreshold scheme.
Furthermore, by using entropies we present a new proof for the lower bound on
the complexity given in [7].
Finally, in Section 5, we present a general construction of w-(t, k, n) multi-
threshold scheme for general values of the parameters. In general, this is not an
optimal scheme, but it is the best known construction that applies to all possible
values of the parameters w, t, k, n.
2 Lower Bounds on the Complexity and Randomness
The complexity and the randomness of a scheme, defined in Section 1.2, are
ratios that indicate the amount of information the trusted authority sends to
users. This section is devoted to study the information rates of multithreshold
schemes, namely to proof the next theorem, a result that provides bounds for
the complexity and the randomness of multithreshold schemes.
Theorem 1. Let U = {1, . . . , n} be the set of users of a w-secure (t, k, n) multi-
threshold scheme, such that H(KQ) is the same for every Q ∈ J and H(Si) is the
same for every i ∈ U . Then, we have following lower bounds on the complexity
σ and the randomness σT :
σ ≥ (w+k−2t+1k−t ) σT ≥ ((w+k−2t+2k−t+1 )+ (t− 1)(w+k−2t+1k−t ))
The following technical lemmas show properties of the entropy of keys in a
multithreshold scheme. They will be used to prove Theorem 1.
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variable X and H(Y |Z) the entropy of Y conditional on Z. If H(Y |Z) = 0, then
H(X|Y ) ≥ H(X|Z) and H(Z) ≥ H(Y ).
Lemma 2. Let U = {1, . . . , n} be the set of participants of a w-secure (t, k, n)
multithreshold scheme. Let A ⊆ U ′ ⊆ U such that |U ′| = w + k − (t − 1) and
|A| = t− 1. Let A be the following collection of subsets: A = {Q ∈ J | A ⊆ Q ⊆
U ′} = {Q1, . . . , Qµ}, where µ =
(
w+k−2(t−1)
k−(t−1)
)
.
Then, H(KQi | KQ1 , . . . ,KQi−1 ,KQi+1 , . . .KQµ) = H(KQi) for every Qi ∈ A.
That is, the random variables KQ1 , . . . ,KQµ are independent.
Proof. Let Qi ∈ A and C = (U ′ rQi) ∪ A. Observe that C consists of w users.
Since C ∩ Qi = A, then |C ∩ Qi| = t − 1, and therefore C is an unauthorized
subset related to the key associated with Qi. That is, H(KQi | SC) = H(KQi).
On the other hand, C ∩Qj ) A for every j 6= i, hence |C ∩Qj | ≥ t. Then, C
is an authorized subset related to the key associated with Qj , that is H(KQj |
SC) = 0, for every j 6= i. Moreover, H(KQ1 , . . . ,KQi−1 ,KQi+1 , . . . ,KQµ | SC) =
0.
Now, using Lemma 1, it follows that
H(KQi | KQ1 , . . . ,KQi−1 ,KQi+1 , . . . ,KQµ) ≥ H(KQi | SC). Consequently,
H(KQi | KQ1 , . . . ,KQi−1 ,KQi+1 , . . . ,KQµ) = H(KQi), and therefore the ran-
dom variables associated with the keys of subsets in A are independent.
Lemma 3. Let U = {1, . . . , n} be the set of participants of a w-secure (t, k, n)
multithreshold scheme. Let B ⊆ U ′ ⊆ U such that |U ′| = w + k − (t − 1) and
|B| = t. Consider the following collection of subsets of U : B = {Q ∈ J | B ⊆
Q ⊆ U ′} = {Q1, . . . , Qν}, where ν =
(
w+k−(t−1)−t
k−t
)
=
(
w+k−2t+1
k−t
)
.
Then, H(KQi | KQ1 . . .KQi−1,KQi+1, . . . ,KQν ) = H(KQi) for every Qi ∈
B, that is, the random variables KQ1 , . . . ,KQν are independent.
Proof. Let A be a subset of B such with t − 1 elements. If we define A as in
Lemma 2, observe that B ⊆ A, thus the random variables KQ1 , . . . ,KQν are
independent.
Lemma 4. Under the conditions and notation of the preceding two lemmas,
H(KB | SA) = H(KB) and H(KA | SB) = H(KArB), for any subset A ⊆ B.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that A = {1, . . . , t − 1} and B =
{1, . . . , t}. For every Qi ∈ A we define Ci = (U ′rQi)∪A. Observe that, as seen
during the proof of Lemma 2,
H(KQi | SCi) = H(KQi) and H(KQj | SCi) = 0 for every j 6= i.
On the other hand, due to entropy properties,
H(KB | SA) =
ν∑
i=1
H(KQi | SAKQ1 . . .KQi−1).
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Furthermore, since H(KQ1 . . .KQi−1 | SCi) = 0, it follows, that
H(KQi | SCiKQ1 . . .KQi−1) = H(KQi | SCi) = H(KQi).
Hence,
H(KB) ≥ H(KB | SA) ≥
ν∑
i=1
H(KQi) = H(KB),
which leads to H(KB | SA) = H(KB).
Using again entropy properties, we obtain
H(KA | SB) =
µ∑
i=1
H(KQi | SBKQ1 . . .KQi−1).
For every Qi in B we have H(KQi | SBKQ1 . . .KQi−1) = 0, because |Qi∩B| = t.
For every Qi in Ar B, we have that B ⊆ Ci, thus
H(KQi | SBKQ1 . . .KQi−1) ≥ H(KQi | SCiKQ1 . . .KQi−1) =
= H(KQi | SCi) = H(KQi).
Hence,
H(KA | SB) =
∑
i∈ArB
H(KQi | SBKQ1 . . .KQi−1) =
∑
i∈ArB
H(KQi) = H(KArB).
Finally, we provide the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. First, we prove the upper bound on σ. Let B = {1, . . . , t}, A = {1, . . . , t−
1} and U ′⊂U such that B⊂U ′ and |U ′| = w+k−t+1, and consider the collection
of subsets B = {Q ∈ J | B ⊆ Q⊂U ′} = {Q1, . . . , Qν}, where ν =
(
w+k−(t−1)−t
k−t
)
.
Lemma 3 ensures that the variables KQ1 , . . . ,KQν are independent, thus
H(KB) = νH(K). Now, for every Q ∈ B we know |B ∩ Q| = t and |A ∩ Q| =
t − 1, hence H(KQ | StSA) = 0 and H(KQ | SA) = H(KQ). Consequently,
H(KB | StSA) = 0 and, by Lemma 4, H(KB | SA) = H(KB). Lemma 1 leads
to H(S) = H(St) ≥ H(KB) = νH(K), and the desired upper bound on σ is
obtained.
LetA be the structure associated with A, defined in Lemma 2. In order to find
an upper bound on σT we use H(SU ) = H(SB)+H(SU | SB). First, we are going
to bound H(SB). Since H(SB) =
∑t
i=1H(Si | S1 . . . ...Si−1), H(KB | StSA) = 0
and H(KB | SA) = H(KB), then it follows that H(St | SA) ≥ H(KB). Now,
since H(Si) = H(S) for every i, then H(Si | S1, . . . ...Si−1) ≥ H(St | SA), and
therefore H(SB) ≥ t · νH(K).
Now, we are going to bound H(SU | SB). Since H(KA | SU ) = 0, we have
H(SU | SB) ≥ H(KA | SB). Applying Lemma 4, it follows that H(KA | SB) =
(µ− ν)H(K), thus H(SU ) ≥ (µ+ (t− 1)ν)H(K), and the desired upper bound
on σT is obtained.
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A useful method to define secret sharing schemes is to consider some linear maps
to define the share of each user and the keys in the scheme. Using this kind of
maps, it will be easy to check whether a coalition can obtain a key through a
linear combination of their shares. Furthermore, the use of linear techniques can
simplify the construction of the scheme.
In linear multisecret schemes, there are some vector spaces over a finite field
K called E, Ei and VP for every i ∈ U and P ∈ J . There is a surjective linear
map φi : E → Ei for every i ∈ U that generates the secret information (the
share) of each user, and there is a surjective linear map piP : E → VP for every
P ∈ J . Choosing x ∈ E uniformly at random, piP (x) is P ’s secret and φi(x) is
the secret information of the user i.
Next result shows a property of linear maps widely used within the security
proofs for most of the schemes presented in this paper. This result is Lemma 3.1
in [9].
Lemma 5. Let E,E0 and E1 be vector spaces over a finite field K. Consider
two linear mappings, φ0 : E → E0 and φ1 : E → E1, where φ0 and φ1 are
surjective. Suppose that a vector x ∈ E is chosen uniformly at random. Then,
1. the value of x0 = φ0(x) can be uniquely determined from x1 = φ1(x) if and
only if kerφ1⊂ kerφ0.
2. the value of x1 provides no information about the value of x0 if and only if
kerφ1 + kerφ0 = E.
A Key Predistribution Scheme (KPS) is a method by which a trusted au-
thority distributes secret information among a set of users in such a way that
every user belonging to a set in a family of privileged subsets is able to compute
a common key associated with that set. This kind of schemes can be seen as
multisecret schemes where the minimal authorized sets are single users.
C. Padro´, I. Gracia, S. Mart´ın and P. Morillo present in [9] some KPSs defined
trough linear maps, that they call Linear KPS (LKPS). That paper presents a
method to generate schemes that base their security on linear algebra properties.
Next theorem is a generalization of Theorem 3.2 in [9] for multisecret sharing
schemes with a given specification structure Γ .
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a specification structure on the set of n users U =
{1, . . . , n}. Let E and Ei 6= {0}, for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, be vector spaces
over a finite field K. Suppose there exist a surjective linear mapping φi : E → Ei
for every user i ∈ U and a surjective linear mapping piP : E → E0 for every
subset P ∈ J satisfying:
1.
⋂
i∈A kerφi⊂ kerpiP for any A ∈ ΓP .
2.
⋂
j∈F kerφj + kerpiP = E for any F ∈ ∆P .
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Γ whose complexity and randomness are:
σ =
maxi∈U dimEi
dimE0
σT =
dimE
dimE0
Proof. The theorem is proven analogously to theorem 3.2 in [9]. We construct
a scheme where we assume that E, Ei, E0, piP and φi are publicly known, for
all i ∈ U and P ∈ J . Given an element x ∈ E randomly chosen, the secret of
P ∈ J is piP (x) and the share of user i is φi(x).
Let A = {i1, . . . , ir} be a subset of users. We consider φA a map from E to
Ei1 × · · · ×Eir defined as φA = φi1 × . . .× φir . Observe that φA(x) is the secret
information known by the users of A and, as φi is surjective for all i ∈ U , φA is
surjective for all A⊂U .
Let ΓP and ∆P be the collection of authorized and unauthorized subsets for
a given P in J . If A is in ΓP , Lemma 5 says that piP (x) can be obtained from
φA(x) if and only if kerφA⊂ kerpiP . But kerφA =
⋂
i∈A kerφi, so by hypothesis
this property holds. But if F ∈ ∆P , by hypothesis
⋂
i∈F kerφi + kerpiP = E, so
it implies that kerφF +kerpiP = E. By Lemma 5, users in F cannot obtain any
information about piP , and the proof is concluded.
Observe that condition 1 in Theorem 2 guarantees H(KP | SA) = 0, so
subsets in ΓP can calculate P ’s secret. Besides, if the scheme satisfies condition
2, then we can ensure that H(KP | SF ) = H(KP ) for all subset in ∆P , so the
scheme is perfect.
We will use Theorem 2 to construct our schemes, so we will use the same kind
of operators and notation used in [9]. For all schemes presented in this paper,
the keys are in K, E0 = VP = K for all P ∈ J .
4 An Optimal w-Secure (2, 3, n) Multithreshold Scheme
In this section we present an optimal w-secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme
constructed using linear techniques, according to the model discussed in section
3. In section 1.2 we have seen that w must be an integer between 0 and n−k+t−1,
so in our case 0 ≤ w ≤ n − 2. When w = n − 2, this scheme is complete and
allows a simpler model, which is presented in subsection 4.3.
In a w-secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme every subset of three users has
a common secret, that will only be revealed if at least two of them share their
secret information. If a subset P ∈ J has a secret, coalitions of w users or less
will have zero knowledge about P ’s secret if such coalitions have at most one
user in P . Considering the notation in 1.2, our case leads to:
– |U| = n
– J = {P ⊆ U : |P | = 3}
– For all P ∈ J ,
• ΓP = {A ⊆ U : |A ∩ P | ≥ 2}
• ∆P = {B ⊆ U : |B| ≤ w, |B ∩ P | ≤ 1}
94.1 Optimal w-Secure (2, 3, n) Multithreshold Scheme Construction
To design a linear multithreshold scheme, some vector spaces E,E0, E1, . . . , En,
defined over a finite field K are required. There is no restriction on the charac-
teristic of K but, as we will see in subsection 4.2, the field must be large enough.
The understanding of the scheme requires familiarity with linear algebra con-
cepts such as dual vector space and tensor product. The appendix provides some
notions on these subjects.
The trusted authority creates an identifier xi ∈ K− {0} for each user i ∈ U ,
that is public; let X = {xi}i∈U . Then, the trusted authority privately sends to
each user a linear map that depends on its identifier.
In the scheme presented in this section,
– E = S2(Kw)× (Kw)∗
– Ei = (Kw)∗ for all i ∈ U
– E0 = K
– For every i ∈ U , the map φi : S2(Kw) × (Kw)∗ −→ (Kw)∗ is defined as
follows:
φi(T, S) = T (vi, ·) + λiS
– For every P = {i, j, k} ∈ J , the map piP : S2(Kw)× (Kw)∗ −→ K is defined
as follows:
piP (T, S) =
= xi·φi(T, S)(λkvj−λjvk)+xj ·φj(T, S)(λivk−λkvi)+xk·φk(T, S)(λjvi−λivj)
where
– λi = −xwi for all i ∈ U
– vi = (1, xi, x2i , . . . , x
w−1
i ) for all i ∈ U
The trusted authority chooses some (T, S) ∈ S2(Kw)×(Kw)∗ and distributes
privately the linear forms φi(T, S) to every user in U . This linear form is the
secret information of each user. Given P = {i, j, k} a subset in J , if two users i
and j share their secrets, using linearity of S together with the symmetry and
bilinearity of T , they can calculate piP (T, S). Namely, since for any {i, j, k}⊂U
we have
[φi(T, S)](λkvj−λjvk)+[φj(T, S)](λivk−λkvi)+[φk(T, S)](λjvi−λivj) = 0 (1)
then,
piP (T, S) = xiφi(T, S)(λkvj − λjvk) + xjφj(T, S)(λivk − λkvi)+
+ xk(−φi(T, S)(λkvj − λjvk)− φj(T, S)(λivk − λkvi)).
For the sake of security in our constructions, in some cases X needs to fulfill
a condition. For a clearer formulation of this condition, we are going to introduce
the following rational functions:
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• f(z, y) =∑wi=1 zwi · w∏
j=1,j 6=i
y − zj
zi − zj ,
where y ∈ K, z = (z1, · · · , zw) ∈ Kw, such that zi 6= zj if i 6= j.
Observe that f(z, zi) = zwi , for every i ∈ {1, · · · , w}.
• g(z, zw+1, zw+2, zw+3) =
= (zw+1 − zw+2)[zww+3f(z, zw+1)f(z, zw+2) + zww+1zww+2f(z, zw+3)] +
+ (zw+2 − zw+3)[zww+1f(z, zw+2)f(z, zw+3) + zww+2zww+3f(z, zw+1)] +
+ (zw+3 − zw+1)[zww+2f(z, zw+3)f(z, zw+1) + zww+3zww+1f(z, zw+2)],
where zw+1, zw+2, zw+3 ∈ K, z = (z1, · · · , zw) ∈ Kw, such that zi 6= zj if i 6= j.
Observe that g(xi1 , . . . , xiw+3) is well defined for every (xi1 , . . . , xiw+3) ∈
Xw+3. The condition on X is:
Condition 1. g(xi1 , . . . , xiw+3) 6= 0 for every (xi1 , . . . , xiw+3) ∈ Xw+3.
Since the least common multiple of the denominators involved in the expres-
sion of g is
m(z) =
w∏
1≤i<j≤w
(zi − zj)2
then we will require that the polynomial
p(z, zw+1, zw+2, zw+3) = g(z, zw+1, zw+2, zw+3) ·m(z)
does not vanish for every (xi1 , . . . , xiw+3) ∈ Xw+3, for xij 6= xik for j 6= k, and
this implies a restriction on the size of the field K. Namely, observe that the
degree of every numerator in f is 2w − 1, and so the degree of every numerator
in g is at most w+ 1+ 2(2w− 1) = 5w− 1. Consequently, deg (p) ≤ (5w− 1) +
2[w(w − 1)].
Due to the symmetries in the definition of f and g, it suffices to check that
p(z, zw+1, zw+2, zw+3) 6= 0 only for
(
n
3
)(
n−3
w
)
points inXw+3. Therefore, applying
Schwartz’s Lemma (Theorem 6 in the appendix), the restriction on the size of
the field is |K| > (n3)(n−3w )[2(5w − 1)w(w − 1)] + 1.
Eventually, Condition 1 must be checked only once, at the beginning of the
protocol. As we will see in 4.3, this condition will not be necessary when the
scheme is complete.
4.2 Security Proof
Theorem 3. Under Condition 1, the scheme just defined is an optimal w-secure
(2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme.
11
Proof. In order to prove that this construction defines a w-secure (2, 3, n) mul-
tithreshold scheme we will use Theorem 2. Taking into account that the struc-
ture ∆P is monotone decreasing and the structure ΓP is monotone increasing
for all P ∈ J , it is enough to prove the conditions in Theorem 2 for minimal
subsets in ΓP and maximal subsets in ∆P . So we have to show that for any
P = {i, j, k} ∈ J and for any subset of P with two elements, e.g. {i, j}, then
kerφi ∩ kerφj is included in kerpiP , and for any B ∈ ∆P , with |B| = w, then
E =
⋂
i∈B kerφi + kerpiP .
Suppose (T, S) belongs to kerφi ∩ kerφj for some i, j ∈ B. Then, for every
{i, j, k} ∈ J , it follows from (1) that [φk(T, S)](λjvi − λivj) = 0. Now, if we
calculate piP (T, S) for any (T, S) ∈ kerφi ∩ kerφj we see that piP (T, S) = 0, so
the first part is proved.
Now we have to prove the second part. Since piP is a linear map and the
image of piP is K, then dimkerpiP = dimE − 1. Therefore it suffices to show
that, for every B ∈ ∆P , there exists an element belonging to
⋂
i∈B kerφi that
does not belong to kerpiP .
As previously mentioned, it suffices to prove the second part for maximal
subsets in ∆P , namely the subsets B ∈ ∆P such that |B| = w. Observe that,
given P ∈ J from a w-secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme, 0 ≤ |B ∩ P | ≤ 1
for any B ∈ ∆P . Thus, given P ∈ J we will separately prove the condition for
the cases |B ∩ P | = 0 and |B ∩ P | = 1.
First, we consider maximal subsets in ∆P with one element in P . In order to
simplify notation, we can assume, without loss of generality, that P = {1, 2, 3}
and B = {3, 4, . . . , w + 2}. Clearly, {v3, v4, . . . , vw+2} is a basis of Kw, since
xi 6= xj for i 6= j.
Consider the operator S ∈ (Kw)∗ such that S(vi) = −λi for all i ∈ B and
the operator T = S ⊗ S. Observe that T is a bilinear symmetrical operator,
T ∈ S2(Kw) (see Appendix A for more details). For any i ∈ B, φi(T, S) =
(S ⊗ S)(vi, ·) + λiS = (S(vi) + λi)S = 0, thus (T, S) belongs to
⋂
i∈B kerφi.
In particular, since {3} = P ∩ B, the chosen operator satisfies φ3(T, S) = 0
and S(v3) = −λ3. Thus, it is straightforward to check that piP (T, S) = (x1 −
x2)λ3(S(v1) + λ1)(S(v2) + λ2).
Now, we check that piP (T, S) 6= 0 showing that each factor is nonzero. By
definition of xi and λi, (x1 − x2) and λ3 are different from zero. Let p(x) be the
polynomial of degree w − 1 defined by p(x) = S(1, x, . . . , xw−1). Observe that
p(xi) = xwi for all i ∈ B = {3, . . . , w+2}. Suppose that p(x) satisfies p(x2) = xw2
(analogously for p(x1) = xw1 ). Then x
w − p(x) is a polynomial of degree w with
w + 1 zeroes, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the result is proved for the
maximal subsets in ∆P having one element in common with P .
Now suppose B and P are disjoint and, without loss of generality, that P =
{1, 2, 3} and B = {4, . . . , w + 3}. Let S be the operator defined by S(vi) = −λi
for all i ∈ B and T = S ⊗ S ∈ S2(Kw). Analogously to the other case, (T, S)
belongs to
⋂
i∈B kerφi.
Let p(x) be a polynomial defined, as above, by p(x) = S(1, x, . . . , xw−1).
Since p(xi) = xwi for all i ∈ B = {4, . . . , w + 3}, by Lagrange interpolation, the
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expression of this polynomial is
p(x) =
w+3∑
i=4
xwi ·
w+3∏
j=4,j 6=i
x− xj
xi − xj = f(x, x4, . . . , xw+3)
If we express piP (T, S) replacing S(vi) by p(xi), we have
piP (T, S) = (x1 − x2)(λ3p(x1)p(x2)− λ1λ2p(x3))
+(x2 − x3)(λ1p(x2)p(x3)− λ2λ3p(x1))
+(x3 − x1)(λ2p(x3)p(x1)− λ1λ3p(x2)) = g(x1, . . . , xw+3)
Taking into account condition 1, we can conclude that piP (T, S) 6= 0. Hence,
for all B ∈ ∆P ,
⋂
i∈B kerφi + kerpiP = E, and the security proof is completed.
This scheme is optimal, so complexity and randomness obtained are minimum
for a w-secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme.
Since dim(Ei) = dim(Kw)∗ = w for all i ∈ U and dimE = dimS2(Kw) +
dim(Kw)∗ =
(
w+1
2
)
+ w, then
σ = w σT =
w(w+1)
2 + w
According to Theorem 1, our scheme is optimal.
4.3 Optimal (n − 2)- Secure (2, 3, n) Multithreshold Scheme
Construction
If the above scheme is complete, then w = n− 2, and Condition 1 is not needed
to obtain an (n − 2)- secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme. The field K needs
only to satisfy |K| > n.
Theorem 4. The scheme defined in subsection 4.1 is an optimal (n−2)- secure
(2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme.
Proof. Observe that, in a (n − 2)- secure (2, 3, n) multithreshold scheme, given
P ∈ J , if B is a maximal subset in ∆P , since |B| = n − 2 then necessarily
|B ∩P | = 1. For this reason, in this case, Condition 1 is not needed in the proof
of Theorem 3.
5 w-Secure (t, k, n) Multithreshold Scheme
In this section, we will design a family of w-secure (t, k, n) multithreshold schemes
for any possible values of w, t, k, n. Namely, 1 ≤ t ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ w ≤
n−k+ t−1, as seen in section 1.2. Unfortunately, these schemes are not optimal
in general.
We also show how to design linear w-secure (t, k′, n) multithreshold schemes,
for any k′ such that t ≤ k′ < k, from a given linear w-secure (t, k, n) multi-
threshold.
Observe that for t = 1 this is an optimal linear KPS, and when k = n and
w = t−1 the scheme presented is also optimal, since it is an ideal secret sharing
scheme.
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5.1 w-Secure (t, k, n) Multithreshold Scheme Construction
Taking into account the definition of linear multithreshold schemes, we are going
to define the vector spaces E and Ei, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, over a finite field K.
There is no restriction on the characteristic of K, but the size of this field must
be greater than n. Again, the understanding of the scheme requires some linear
algebra concepts as dual vector space and tensor product (see Appendix A).
During the setup phase, the trusted authority chooses X = {xi}i∈U ⊆ Kr {0},
such that xi 6= xj if i 6= j, which will be the identifiers of users in U .
Let m = w − t+ 2. For the scheme presented in this section,
– E = (Sk(Km))t = Sk(Km)×
t)· · · ×Sk(Km)
– Ei = Sk−1(Km) for all i ∈ U
– E0 = K
– For every i ∈ U , the map φi : (Sk(Km))t −→ Sk−1(Km) is defined as follows:
φi(T1, . . . , Tt) = λi,1T1(vi, . . .) + · · ·+ λi,tTt(vi, . . .)
where
• vi = (1, xi, x2i , . . . , xm−1i ) ∈ Km for all i ∈ U .
• λi,j = xj−1i for all i ∈ U , 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
– For every P = {i1, . . . , ik} ∈ J , the map piP : (Sk(Km))t −→ K is defined
as follows:
piP (T1, . . . , Tt) = T1(vi1 , . . . , vik)
Let P be a set in J , and A a subset of t users in P . Without loss of generality,
we can suppose that P = {1, . . . , k} and A = {1, . . . , t}. Since Tj is symmetrical,
Tj(vi, v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vk) = Tj(v1, . . . , vk), then user i can calculate
si,P = λi,1T1(v1, . . . , vk) + · · ·+ λi,tTt(v1, . . . , vk)
By sharing the values si,P , for i = 1, . . . , t, the users in A can solve the linear
system  1 x1 . . . x
t−1
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 xt . . . xt−1t

 T1(v1, . . . , vk)...
Tt(v1, . . . , vk)
 =
 s1,P...
st,P

and they obtain the secret T1(v1, . . . , vk).
The complexity and randomness of this scheme are:
σ =
(
w+k−t
k−1
)
σT = 1t ·
(
w+k−t+1
k
)
Now we prove the validity of the scheme.
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Theorem 5. The scheme above defined is a w-secure (t, k, n) multithreshold
scheme.
Proof. We follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 3. That is, it suf-
fices to show that for any P ∈ J , then every A ⊆ P such that |A| = t sat-
isfies
⋂
i∈A kerφi ⊆ kerpiP , and every B ∈ ∆P such that |B| = w, satisfies⋂
i∈B kerφi + kerpiP = E.
Let P = {1, . . . , k} ∈ J and A = {1, . . . , t}⊂P . If we take (T1, . . . , Tt) in⋂t
i=1 kerφi, then λi,1T1(vi, . . .) + · · · + λi,tTt(vi, . . .) = 0 ∈ Sk−1(Km) for every
i ∈ A, and consequently λi,1T1(v1, . . . , vk)+ · · ·+λi,tTt(v1, . . . , vk) = 0 for every
i ∈ A.
Since λi,j = x
j−1
i , the above equations can be expressed as follows: 1 x1 . . . x
t−1
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 xt . . . xt−1t

 T1(v1, . . . , vk)...
Tt(v1, . . . , vk)
 =
 0...
0

Since
(
xj−1i
)
i,j
is an invertible matrix, then Ti(v1, . . . , vk) = 0, for every
i = 1, . . . , t. In particular, T1(v1, . . . , vk) = 0, and so (T1, . . . , Tt) ∈ kerpiP .
Since piP is a non-zero linear form, then dimkerpiP = dimE−dim Im(piP ) =
dimE−1. Thus, to prove that for any B ∈ ∆P we have
⋂
i∈B kerφi+kerpiP = E,
it suffices to show that there exists an element belonging to
⋂
i∈B kerφi that does
not belong to kerpiP .
Let B a maximal subset in ∆P , F ⊆ BrP such that |F | = w−t+1 = m−1,
and G the vector subspace of Km with dimension m − 1 spanned by 〈vi〉i∈F .
Observe that, if i /∈ F , then vi /∈ G. Let {e1, . . . , em−1} be an orthogonal basis of
G. Then, there exists a vector em ∈ Km such that {e1, . . . , em} is an orthogonal
basis of Km. Let (Km)∗ be the dual space of Km and {e1, . . . , em} its dual
basis. Now, consider the symmetric operator T̂ = em⊗ k)· · · ⊗em ∈ Sk(Km). It is
straightforward to check that T̂ (vi, . . .) = 0 for every i ∈ F , and T̂ (v1, . . . , vk) 6=
0, for P = {1, . . . , k}.
Let T = (µ1T̂ , . . . , µtT̂ ) ∈ (Sk(Km))t. We want to determine the coefficients
µ1, . . . , µt ∈ K such that T ∈
⋂
i∈B kerφi, but T 6∈ kerpiP . By definition of T̂ ,
φi(T ) = 0 for every i ∈ F . On the other hand, φi(T ) = φi(µ1T̂ , . . . , µtT̂ ) =
(λi,1µ1+ · · ·+λi,tµt) T̂ (vi, . . .), for every i ∈ BrF . The homogeneous (t−1)× t
linear system λi,1µ1+ · · ·+λi,tµt = 0, where i ∈ BrF has non-trivial solution,
and µi 6= 0 for every i ∈ B (if any µi were 0, then the resulting homogeneous
(t − 1) × (t − 1) linear system would have only the trivial solution, µj = 0 for
every j).
Hence, we have found an operator T in
⋂
i∈B kerφi such that piP (T ) =
µ1T̂ (v1, . . . , vk) is different from zero, so T does not belong to kerpiP . There-
fore, the proof is completed.
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5.2 A family of w-Secure (t, k′, n) Multithreshold Schemes,
from a given w-Secure (t, k, n) Multithreshold Scheme
As a final observation, we show how to construct, from a given w-secure (t, k, n)
multithreshold scheme, a w-secure (t, k′, n) multithreshold scheme for any k′
satisfying t ≤ k′ < k.
The new scheme is like the one in subsection 5.1, except for the following
differences:
– The collection of subsets of users that have a key is J ′ = {P ′ ⊆ U : |P ′| =
k′}.
– To implement this scheme the set of users must be ordered, and this order
must be known by every user.
– For every ordered set P ′ = {i1, . . . , ik′} ∈ J ′, the map piP : (Sk(Km))t −→ K
is defined as follows:
piP ′(T1, . . . , Tt) = T1(vi1 , . . . , vik′−1 , vik′ , . . . , vik′ )
Let P ′ be a set in J ′, and A a subset of t users in P ′. Without loss of
generality, we can suppose that P ′ = {1, . . . , k′} and A = {1, . . . , t}. Since Tj is
symmetrical, then user i can calculate
si,P ′ = λi,1T1(v1, . . . , vk′−1, vk′ , . . . , vk′) + · · ·+ λi,tTt(v1, . . . , vk′−1, vk′ , . . . , vk′)
Users from A can share si,P ′ , i = 1, . . . , t, and consequently they obtain the
secret T1(v1, . . . , vk′−1, vk′ , . . . , vk′) associated with P ′, by solving the following
linear system:
 1 x1 . . . x
t−1
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 xt . . . xt−1t

 T1(v1, . . . , vk′−1, vk′ , . . . , vk′)...
Tt(v1, . . . , vk′−1, vk′ , . . . , vk′)
 =
 s1,P ′...
st,P ′

A Appendix
For the sake of completeness, this appendix contains some additional definitions
and results. Since the schemes presented in this paper are based on linear maps
and multilinear forms, we present here a brief introduction to the notions of dual
space and multilinear forms over a vector space.
Given a vector space E over a field K, we define the dual space E∗ as the
set of linear applications from E to K. The spaces E and E∗ have the same
dimension.
If {e1, . . . , en} is a basis of E, then the dual basis {e1, . . . , en} of E∗ is defined
as follows:
ei(ej) =
{
1 if i = j
0 otherwise
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Let v =
∑n
i=1 λiei ∈ E and w =
∑n
j=1 µje
j ∈ E∗, then
w(v) =
n∑
j=1
µje
j(
n∑
i=1
λiei) =
n∑
i=1
λiµi
Let F be a subspace of E, then the orthogonal subspace of F is the following
subspace of E∗:
F⊥ = {w ∈ E∗ : w(v) = 0 for every v ∈ F}
A multilinear form in En is a map from En to K that is separately linear in
each variable. If w is a multilinear form in En, then w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ (E∗)n,
and for every v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ En we have
w : En → K
v 7→ w(v) = w1(v1)w2(v2) · · ·wn(vn)
Multilinear forms that are invariant under permutation of its variables are called
symmetric multilinear forms, and the subspace of symmetric multilinear forms
in En is Sn(E). Observe that, given w ∈ Sn(E), for every permutation σ of
{1, . . . , n} and for every (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ En we have:
w(v1, . . . , vn) = w(vσ(1), . . . , vσ(n))
If dimE = m, then dimSn(E) =
(
n+m−1
n
)
.
Finally, we provide Schwartz’s Lemma.
Theorem 6. (Schwartz’s Lemma) Let p ∈ K[X1, . . . , XN ] be a nonzero polyno-
mial on N variables of degree d < |K|. Then, there exists a point (x1, . . . , xN )
in KN such that p(x1, . . . , xN ) 6= 0.
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